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FAMILY TRAITS 
Inga Markovits * 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAM-
ILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE. By Mary Ann 
Glendon. Chicago: The University of Chic~go Press. 1989. Pp. xv, 
320. $32.50. 
Make any assertion about the state of the modem family, and there 
is a good chance that its opposite will be just as plausible. The family 
seems a fragile and threatened institution, yet it also appears remarka-
bly resilient. Most Americans believe American family life to be in a 
sad state of decline, yet most think that their own family lives are 
healthy and satisfying.1 Record divorce rates challenge the very con-
cept of marriage, yet most divorced people are quick to try marriage 
again. 2 Women have made dramatic gains in their quest for equality 
with men, yet crucial differences in earnings and household duties re-
fuse to disappear.3 
American family law doctrine and case law are equally filled with 
riddles and contradictions. Has state interference with family deci-
sions increased or decreased during the past twenty-five years? While 
entering or leaving a marriage has become easier than ever before, 
property and custody matters after divorce increasingly are left to ju-
dicial discretion. Are spouses more or less restricted in contracting 
with each other? While courts are more ready to allow prenuptial 
agreements, they also are more ready to disregard them if the marriage 
breaks up. Do fathers, no longer constricted by sexual stereotypes, 
now play a larger role in the lives of their children? While joint legal 
custody upon divorce is on the rise, sole physical custody by fathers is 
not. 4 How much control does a child have over his own life? The 
Supreme Court, in two cases decided on the very same day, has de-
* Morris and Rita Atlas Family Centennial Professor, The University of Texas School of 
Law. Referendar, 1960, Dr. jur. 1966, Free University of Berlin; LL.M. 1969, Yale. - Ed. 
1. MAss. MUT. LIFE INS. Co., MAss. MUTUAL AMERICAN FAMILY VALUES STUDY 29-30 
(1989). 
2. Nearly half of all recent marriages in the United States are remarriages for one or both 
partners. Levine, The Second Time Around: Realities of Remarriage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Jan. 29, 1990, at 50. 
3. Fuchs reports that while women, on average, earn 60% of men's wages, they do more than 
twice the amount of housework and childcare. v. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR EcoNOMIC 
EQUALITY 50, 78 (1988). 
4. Maccoby, Depner & Mnookin, Custody of Children Following Divorce, in IMPACT OF DI· 
VORCE, SINGLE-PAP.ENTING, AND STEP-PARENTING ON CHILDREN 91, 112 (M. Hetherington & 
J. Arasteh eds. 1988). · 
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clared children both capable5 and incapable6 of the "sound judg-
ment[]"7 needed to make important decisions affecting their welfare. 
There can be little doubt that recent decades have brought amaz-
ing changes to family life and law not only in the United States but 
elsewhere in the industrialized world. Consider only the rise in di-
vorce rates8 or in extramarital births, 9 the widespread acceptance of 
unmarried cohabitation, the almost universal victory of no-fault di-
vorce, or the total remodeling of marital property law. "Revolution" 
does not seem too big a word to describe what has happened.10 But 
what, exactly, has happened? What has this revolution brought, what 
ideology keeps it together, what promises does it hold out for the 
future? 
In her book The Transformation of Family Law, Mary Ann Glen-
don 11 looks at the bewildering changes affecting Western family life 
and behavior during the past quarter-century through the medium of 
law. Not that Professor Glendon believes that the law is at the bottom 
of these changes. She is skeptical about the law's power to affect peo-
ple's behavior, alert to the stubborn resilience of custom, and aware of 
the many ways in which the addressees of the law can quietly subvert 
or defeat a legislature's intentions. But she also believes that connec-
tions exist between law and social change, that legal rules may give 
some shape and direction to uncertain social developments (p. 311 ), 
that the law's powerful symbolism may affect the ways in which we 
perceive our relations with others (pp. 194, 312), and that, in any case, 
the law can tell "stor[ies]" about "roles and relationships that are cen-
tral in most people's lives" (p. 2). By comparing recent developments 
in the family law of England, France, the United States, and West 
Germany (with occasional glances at Sweden), Glendon wants to trace 
the narrative lines of these stories. She looks for patterns in the ways 
in which our laws have changed, for the shared or divergent beliefs 
that these patterns reflect, and for what these beliefs can ~ell us about 
ourselves, our relations with others, and our views of the state. 
The Transformation of Family Law is a successor to Glendon's 
5. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (children capable of waiving Miranda rights). 
6. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (children incapable of deciding about their need for 
mental health treatment). 
7. Parham, 442 U.S. at 603. 
8. Divorce rates in the United States rose from 2.2 per 1000 population in 1960 to 5.2 per 
1000 population in 1980. Since then, divorce rates have dropped slightly to 5.0 per 1000 popula-
tion in 1985. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL AllsTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 85 (109th ed. 1989). 
9. Extramarital births in the United States rose from 10.7% of all births in 1970 to 23.4% of 
all births in 1986. Id. at 66. 
10. The word "revolution" is used, for instance, both by V. Fuces, supra note 3, at 10, and 
by Teitelbaum & DuPaix, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Divorce: Natural Experimentation 
in Family Law, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1093, 1093 (1988). 
11. Professor of Law, Harvard University. - Ed. 
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State, Law and Family, 12 published in 1977, when the developments 
that both books describe were about to gather full strength. Origi-
nally, the new volume was simply meant to update its predecessor. In 
the end, much of the material was rearranged, many passages were 
rewritten, and emphasis was redistributed throughout the text. But 
the work's structure and methodology have remained largely the same 
and the thirteen years since its original appearance have not been 
enough to allow the new book to speak with finality about the changes 
it depicts. On the contrary, like its predecessor, The Transformation 
of Family Law conveys a dizzying sense of events still in flux. This 
unruly and Protean quality of her subject matter - the fact that we 
are dealing with a field that is alive and full of surprises - makes 
Glendon's search for the leitmotifs which might guide and steady our 
interpretations even more urgent. 
If you look for the significant lines of development running 
through as large a field of learning as comparative family law, two 
different methods suggest themselves. You can either zoom in on the 
essential patterns you discover, outline the common concerns or con-
victions running like colored threads through the entire fabric of fam-
ily law, and use concrete examples only to illustrate overall themes. 
Or, you can describe the developments in different areas offamily law, 
highlight in each area those details which manifest common strands of 
thinking, and in the end pull these strands together to arrive at a 
meaningful picture. The first approach will require you to articulate 
your themes at the outset, will allow you to pick and choose your 
supportive evidence, will encourage theoretical speculation, and thus 
is likely to produce forceful and consistent results. But it will also 
tempt you to overstate your case, will make it easier to disregard con-
flicting evidence, will hide from your readers how you discovered your 
themes in the first place, and thus will make criticism and disagree-
ment more difficult. The second approach will require extensive de-
scription, obliging you to spend much time on matters only 
tangentially related to your search for common patterns of develop-
ment, will limit occasions for analytical speculation, and will produce 
more conflicting results. But it will also guard against theoretical 
overstatements, will put your cards on the table, and will educate 
readers sufficiently about the field to allow them to make up their own 
minds. 
Professor Glendon uses the second, more descriptive, approach. 
Choosing six topics (the formation of marriage, the law of ongoing 
family relationships, divorce, the legal effects of divorce, inheritance, 
and cohabitation), she outlines for each the state of the law prior to the 
reforms in each of her four chosen countries, compares problems and 
solutions across national borders, points to telling differences and simi-
12. M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY (1977). 
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larities, and in this fashion-knowledgeably, perceptively, gracefully, 
in language both warm and precise - alerts us to the common themes 
running through the developments under review. The result is both a 
comprehensive survey - what a wonderful text to use in a class on 
comparative family law! - and a sympathetic portrait of marriage and 
family everywhere besieged by social and economic change. The pat-
terns of this change emerge indirectly, almost unobtrusively. As we 
read on, we are struck by the recurrence of themes - "There it is 
again," we think, as if hearing by now familiar bars of music - and 
although the final chapter pulls the strands together, it does so in an 
understated fashion, more to remind us of what we have learned and 
to reflect on its meaning than to force the different elements of the 
book into a sharply defined theoretical framework. 
Professor Glendon is too careful and honest a scholar, and too 
much interested in the variety of detail revealed by her comparative 
survey, to condense her findings into a structure which, after all, might 
be too rigid and too unambiguous to do justice to the richness of her 
material. Many readers, looking for a perceptive survey of Western 
family law, will agree. 13 But to me, the thematic consistency of Glen-
don's overall picture is by far the most interesting aspect of her book, 
and for argument's sake, I would have liked her to overstate - rather 
than understate - its significance. So let me retrace for you, although 
not always in Glendon's terms and at times in perhaps too categorical 
a fashion, the most striking lines of her portrait of West European and 
American family law. 
1. The privatization of marriage. Marriage, once a relationship 
about which the state had a great deal to say, has increasingly become 
a matter determined by the partners themselves. Getting married is 
considerably easier than it used to be: marriage requirements (like pa-· 
rental consent (p. 42) and minimum age-levels) have been relaxed; 
marriage impediments (based on affinity or remote consanguinity) 
have gradually been dropped (p. 56-57); even when prohibitions re-
main (like those against bigamy), their violation will be less strictly 
prosecuted than in the past and will most likely not affect the legiti-
macy of offspring (p. 54); and the freedom to marry, in three of the 
four countries under review, has taken on constitutional dimensions 
(pp. 75-82). 
Once married, the spouses are expected to fashion their relation-
ship to suit their own purposes rather than to conform to the state's 
codified marriage model (pp. 87-93). The law thus no longer assumes 
a standard division of functions between breadwinning husband and 
housekeeping wife, leaves it up to the spouses whether or not to share 
a common name or residence (pp. 90, 103-10), and has renounced its 
13. A friend of mine, to whom I lent my review copy for a week, returned it after two days. 
"I ordered my own copy," she said, "it's the kind of book you've got to own." 
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former position that prenuptial agreements contemplating divorce are 
against public policy (p. 137; discussing American law). 
The state has also relinquished control over the exit from marriage. 
With the demise of divorce systems based on fault, officially accepted 
reasons for leaving one's spouse are no longer required (p. 149). No-
fault divorce, accompanied (in the U.S. more than elsewhere) by the 
limitation of alimony rights, has made it easy and cheap to abandon 
unsatisfactory unions. Although theoretically a marriage's irretriev-
able breakdown must be proved before a court will grant a divorce, 
courts will almost always accept the spouses' own diagnosis of the 
state of their relationship (p. 190). 
All these changes add up to what Glendon calls the "dejuridifica-
tion" (p. 293) of marriage: its transformation from a relationship au-
thenticated and molded by legal rules to a relationship deriving its 
dignity from the spouses' personal choices and feelings. Specific con-
sequences will still follow from legal marriage, especially in areas af-
fecting private property interests, such as inheritance law. But the 
legal impact of marriage is rapidly diminishing; for many purposes, it 
may no longer matter whether spouses are married or not (e.g., if child 
custody or welfare issues are at stake). Any legal shackles can easily 
be cast off if one side so chooses, and many couples will simply not 
marry at all. What matters is not law but love. 
2. The socialization of the family. While the state has largely 
withdrawn from the regulation of marital choices, it has returned, 
with a vengeance, to manage the economic and pedagogic conse-
quences of our emotional commitments: the relationships between 
parents and children, the support needs of children and ex-spouses, 
the allocation of custody upon divorce. State agencies administering 
public education, health care, or welfare have taken over many family 
functions. If conflicts arise between family members, courts seem less 
concerned with the adjudication of formal disputes than with the dis-
pensation of substantive justice. Putting into practice the almost un-
limited discretion conveyed by the "best interest" standard, judges can 
decide whether a child needs an abortion, may get married, has been 
abused or neglected, or which of two contesting spouses would make 
the "better" parent. And although the best-interest test applies only 
to children, family court judges will, in fact, also try to find the solu-
tion which is "best" for the adults involved. Where alimony and mari-
tal property disputes were once resolved on the basis of formal rules 
(focusing on legal title, premarital contract, the spouses' respective 
fault, and the like), they are now decided almost exclusively by judicial 
discretion (pp. 200, 228). As a result, the power of courts over indi-
vidual lives has greatly increased. Where in the past judges were pas-
sive, they now are active; where they once applied legal criteria to 
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narrowly defined disputes over rights, they now devise practical solu-
tions to take care of the needs of families in trouble. 
3. The move away from legal formalism. With the dejuriclifica-
tion of marriage and the growing importance of discretionary deci-
sionmaking, statutory language and doctrinal distinctions are losing 
significance. Regardless of whether they follow the community-prop-
erty or the separate-property scheme, for instance, virtually all Ameri-
can states allow some form of discretionary division of property upon 
divorce (p. 228). Marriage, once the only respectable form of sexual 
partnership, has lost its exclusive legal status and is becoming the 
"source of convenient analogies" (p. 287) for problems that also arise 
between cohabitants unconnected by legal ties (like disputes over 
property or custody issues). Indeed, as far as public law benefits are 
concerned, long-term cohabitation may even entail legal consequences 
that short-term marriage does not (p. 290). If the welfare of children 
is at stake, all legal systems under review are particularly willing to 
disregard legal distinctions and to focus instead on blood-ties and ac-
tual need: discrimination based on a child's extramarital birth is no 
longer considered legitimate (p. 290). And with judicial attention cen-
tered on needs rather than rights, judges can no longer base their deci-
sions on legal reasoning alone and must increasingly rely on the advice 
of nonlegal experts like psychologists and social workers. 
4. The fragmented image of the family. As formal legal ties be-
tween family members are losing importance, the unit they hold to-
gether seems to become of less concern to the law than its individual 
members. Legal rules protecting the marriage relationship itself 
against attacks from the outside (like the American tort of "criminal 
conversation" or English "heart balm" actions) have either been abol-
ished or are rarely used (p. 142). Tort law is abandoning spousal im-
munity rules; evidence law increasingly facilitates one spouse's 
testimony against the other (p. 143). Constitutional law protects the 
husband's or wife's individual privacy rights even in situations in 
which the unilateral exercise of these rights cannot but damage the 
relationship between the spouses (as in the case of abortion). 14 Public 
assistance programs and social security laws, meant to ensure the sat-
isfaction of base-line, everyday needs, focus on the individual in need 
regardless of family status (p. 296). 
The law thus conveys an "atomistic image of the family"; 15 people 
appear unconnected, bent on pursuing their own happiness as each 
defines it, and if the new view brings more individual freedom, it also 
brings more exposure to the state and its agencies. While, for instance, 
14. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (married woman 
does not need her husband's consent to obtain an abortion). 
15. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transfonnation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. 
L. REV. 1803, 1857 (1985). 
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the husband's or father's authority will no longer be enough to close 
the door to state intervention protecting family members (e.g., police 
interference in cases of family violence), the law's tendency to "break 
the family down into its component parts" (p. 295) may also weaken 
family ties. At a minimum, it will reflect a weakening of family ties -
since simple causal connections between law and social change seem 
rather doubtful - and thus contribute to a picture of society in which 
individuals, already robbed of such mediating structures as churches 
and extended kinship networks, are increasingly left on their own 
when facing the state (p. 298). 
5. Changing notions of morality. In the old days, when divorce 
was based upon fault, the law seemed to know what was morally right 
or wrong. Marriage was presumed to involve a life-long commitment 
which, if broken, entitled the innocent and injured spouse to compen-
sation for the other's transgressions. Husbands and wives had differ-
ent marital roles, which were reflected in property and support rules 
(pp. 112-16). The marriage relationship deserved moral and legal ap-
proval and children born from extramarital unions could not be al-
lowed to intrude with equal claims upon the legitimate family. 
With the introduction of divorce based on marital breakdown, 
family law "has abandoned its high-minded aspirations" (p. 145). 
Marriage is no longer seen as a moral commitment but as an attempt 
to achieve personal happiness. 16 If it breaks down, it is more impor-
tant to restructure disrupted lives than to search for a culprit. In the 
interest of a therapeutic clean break, continuing responsibilities be-
tween the ex-spouses should be kept to a minimum. As a result, life-
long alimony after divorce - always more important in theory than in 
practice - has almost disappeared. 
Family law today does not pretend to know how people should 
lead their lives - which is just as well, since lifestyles that once were 
considered objectionable (like unmarried cohabitation) are now com-
monplace. But even if people lead lives that by modern standards are 
still unconventional (as in the case of homosexual couples), courts will 
increasingly try to disregard unorthodox sexual behavior and treat it 
as private as long as it does not affect a person's social performance (as 
in custody disputes). 17 Moral issues, if they are thought to exist at all, 
are thus increasingly compartmentalized and defused. 18 Family law 
has become morally "bland" (p. 145) and nonjudgmental, focusing on 
16. On the diminution of moral discourse in modern family law, see id. 
17. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983); S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 
699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985). 
18. Agreements by which unmarried cohabitants regulate the details of their relationship, for 
instance, once viewed as immoral and thus invalid in their entirety, are now judged by "a nar-
rower and more precise standard" and are considered "unenforceable only to the extent that 
[they] explicitly rest[] upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services." 
Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 669, 557 P.2d 106, 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 821 (1976). 
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the outer rather than on the inner man, interested not in moral ques-
tions but in socially practicable answers, and - within these parame-
ters - leaving each to pursue the good life on his own. 
6. The growing importance of public law. As family law has 
switched its attention from enforcing private commitments (as under 
the fault system of divorce, for instance) to solving social problems 
(the protection of children or the integration of divorced women into 
the work process, for example), its style of dealing with issues has also 
begun to change. Private law is increasingly being pushed out by pub-
lic law regulation. Substantively, welfare law, social security law, tax 
law, and the like affect the ways in which families live more than ever 
before (p. 295). Procedurally, family-law judges use their virtually un-
bounded discretion to solve family problems in ways that look less like 
adjudication than welfare administration. Jurisprudentially, family 
law's focus on needs rather than rights implies also the rejection of 
traditional notions of fairness in favor of social engineering. 
7. The democratization of family law. In earlier centuries, family 
law dealt primarily with marriage-related issues of property and con-
tract, and thus with the affairs of the wealthy. Since then, it has come 
down in the world:19 from serving the rich, by way of the middle 
classes, to attending to the needs of the poor, and from a preoccupa-
tion with "old" property (like investments or real estate) to a concern 
with various forms of "new property" derived from employment rela-
tionships or social welfare policies (p. 294). This "democratization"20 
is mirrored within the family structure itself, where former hierarchies 
between husband and wife, and to a lesser extent between parent and 
child, are slowly being leveled and replaced by more egalitarian 
relationships. 
So these are the dominant themes running through Professor Glen-
don's account of the transformation offamily law. Of course, it would 
not be difficult to find counterthemes. Take just one example: the 
"demoralization" of modern family law, with its refusal to endorse 
specific notions of the good life,21 seems contradicted by recent signs 
of a "greening" of family law, of attempts to encourage warmer family 
interactions and to foster greater solidarity among family members 
through statutory admonitions (for instance, the famous Swedish no-
spanking law (p. 99)) or through the further extension of family obli-
gations (for example, obligations to support children beyond the age of 
minority22). But such countervailing trends - and there are others -
19. See Friedman, Rights of Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OR. L. R.Ev. 
649 (1984). 
20. The term is used on p. 111. 
21. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
22. See Moore, Parents' Support Obligations to Their Adult Children, 19 AKRON L. REV. 183 
(1985). ' 
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do not detract from Glendon's overall picture. Her main themes ring 
very true. And the fact that the different strands of Glendon's pattern 
of change mesh so well - that often the same phenomenon seems to 
express several of the new modes of thought Glendon describes23 -
also speaks for the internal consistency of her portrayal. 
And yet, somehow, I find myself not quite satisfied. For all its 
persuasiveness, reading Glendon's book is a bit like observing the in-
nards of an old-fashioned watch: you see the numerous cogwheels 
turn, you see that they are obviously interconnected, but you still do 
not know what really makes the thing tick. Unlike Glendon's previ-
ous book on abortion and divorce, whose powerful dominant theme 
can be captured in one sentence,24 The Transformation of Family Law 
lacks a central thesis, lacks the thrust of a focused argument. Maybe 
the structure of Glendon's book - its attempt to relate accurately the 
developments in a large field of law - has stood in the way of con-
densing her findings into a single theoretical punchline. Maybe there 
can be no such punchline. Maybe the attempt to force diffuse and 
contradictory developments into a single argument explaining their 
movement could not possibly do justice to the complexity of the issues. 
Yet Glendon herself alludes to one possible thesis that I wish she 
had explored further. In her final chapter, she returns to the theme of 
the "democratization" of family law, mentioned more or less en pas-
sant in the preceding chapters (pp. 9, 111), and tells us that many of 
the legal changes described throughout her book "can be regarded as 
adjustments to the needs of new clienteles to whom much of tradi-
tional family law was irrelevant because they were without significant 
property or social position." She goes on to list modern family law's 
preoccupation with "new property" issues and "the appearance of new 
forms of state intervention in family life" as examples (p. 294). 
Indeed, the switch from private law to public law regulation might 
well be due to the fact that family law's "hitherto neglected groups"25 
will not be served by a law preoccupied with property or contract 
rights (which they are unlikely to possess) but by legal policies ensur-
ing the satisfaction of minimum needs. The same rationale could ex-
plain other developments. The new family law's reluctance to 
moralize, for instance, might be seen to reflect the realistic insight that 
23. The modern legal treatment of unmarried cohabitation, for instance, reflects the priva-
tization of marriage (the law attaches legal consequences to private unions which do not conform 
to the state's marriage model); corresponds to the changing notions of morality (the law no longer 
ignores cohabitation as being immoral and therefore outside of the law's protection); and ex-
presses the move away from formalism (the factual relationship, like the parties' economic coop-
eration or the birth of common children, counts more than legally sanctioned ties). 
24. Mary Ann Glendon's Abortion and Divorce in Western Law deals with the law's role in 
affirming or denying our moral responsibilities toward others (be it the fetus or those left behind 
in a broken marriage relationship). M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 
(1987). 
25. Max Rheinstein's phrase is quoted by Glendon on p. 9. 
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self-righteous principles of proper behavior are a luxury that only the 
rich can afford. The law's focus on individuals rather than family 
units corresponds to the actual fragmentation of families under the 
pressures of poverty and to the fact that family members in need can-
not always tum to each other for help but must increasingly rely on 
the state. If there is one key to Glendon's analysis, one common de-
nominator which could help us to understand her stories, I think it 
must be the poverty and dependence of family law's new clients. This 
explanation would interlock with another intriguing theme that Glen-
don touches upon but does not pursue: the historical connection be-
tween family law and the development of property structures. 
In the following pages, I want to look at the "new clients" of mod-
em family law, and at the question of how the changes recorded by 
Glendon affect their lives, from my own specific comparative angle: 
the viewpoint of socialist law. This approach is less far-fetched than it 
may at first seem - even if we consider that socialists always had 
something to say about law and the propertyless. But there is another, 
and somewhat surprising reason which makes me draw the connec-
tion: Glendon's picture of the transformation of modem capitalist 
family law corresponds - feature for feature - to the family law ide-
als of early Soviet socialism. Let me explain. 
Marxist theory had always been critical of the hierarchical struc-
ture of capitalist family life and had accused the bourgeoisie of 
"reduc[ing] the family relation to a mere money relation. "26 Engels 
had compared the position of wives to that of the proletariat (with 
husbands in the role of the capitalists) and had listed as "the first 
premise for the emancipation of women ... the reintroduction of the 
entire female sex into public industry .... "27 Marxists foretold that in 
a future communist society men and women would be free and equal 
producers, that the "economic foundations of monogamy ... will dis-
appear,"28 that marriage, liberated of all property concerns, would be 
based only on mutual love and thus would be moral only as long as 
that love persisted,29 and that society would enable women to join men 
in the production process by taking over such former family tasks as 
household duties30 and the care and education of children.31 Accord-
26. Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 
476 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1978). 
27. Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in id. at 744. 
28. Id. at 745. 
29. Id. at 750-51. 
30. August Bebe!, in Die Frau und der Sozia/ismus predicted that "central food production 
institutions" would render domestic kitchens "completely redundant" and that public laundries 
and cleaning establishments would take over the washing of linen and clothes and the cleaning of 
carpets. A. BEBEL, DIE FRAU UND DER SOZIALISMUS 471 (1920) (my translation). 
31. Id. at 449; Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in THE 
MARX-ENGELS READER, supra note 26, at 746. 
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ing to this ideological blueprint, early Soviet family legislation32 intro-
duced the legal equality of the spouses, 33 permitted unilateral 
divorce,34 put informal ''de facto" marriages on the same legal footing 
as formally registered marriages,35 abolished illegitimacy,36 and -
while still providing for family support obligations - structured these 
obligations in a way that demonstrated the belief that family members 
would have to fill in only temporarily for a state that soon would be 
economically able to care for all of its members. 37 
If one steps back to survey the leitmotifs of this legislation, it turns 
out that they are extraordinarily similar to those traced by Glendon in 
her account of recent Western developments. Like our family law, 
early Soviet family law believed in the privatization of marriage: mar-
riage was seen as an emotional union relieved of its economic and 
child-rearing functions and therefore of no concern to the state, legiti-
mated solely by the mutual affection of the spouses, 38 and thus - of 
course!- subject to divorce if that affection should fade. 39 Even more 
than we, early Soviet socialists believed in the socialization of the fam-
32. The main pieces of legislation were: the Decree on the Introduction of Divorce of Dec. 
19, 1917; the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) Code on Marriage, the Fam-
ily and Guardianship of Oct. 17, 1918; and the RSFSR Family Code of Nov. 19, 1926. Excerpts 
of all three statutes are translated in R. SCHLESINGER, CHANGING ATTITUDES IN SOVIET RUS-
SIA: THE FAMILY IN THE USSR (1949). For a thoughtful description and analysis of pre-
Stalinist Soviet family law development, see w. GOLDMAN, THE "WITHERING AWAY" AND 
THE RESURRECTION OF THE SOVIET FAMILY, 1917-1936 (1987) (unpublished dissertation). 
33. The 1918 Family Code introduced the spouses' right to choose their common marital 
name (§ 100) and to maintain separate residences (§ 104), gave both spouses equal parental 
rights(§§ 150-51), and introduced separate property(§ 105). The 1926 Code abolished the need 
for a common surname (§ 7), entitled the spouses to choose their respective trades or occupations 
(§ 9) and to enter into contractual relationships with each other (§ 13), and - to protect the 
economically weaker wife - established community property. Upon divorce, the couple's 
shared property was to be divided according to the court's discretion (§ 10). See R. ScHLES· 
INGER, supra note 32, at 35-39, 155-56. 
34. The 1918 Code allowed consensual divorce at the Civil Registrar's office (§ 91) and uni-
lateral divorce before a court (§§ 87, 90). Under the 1926 Code, an application by only one of 
the spouses was sufficient to register a divorce at the Civil Registrar's office(§§ 18, 19). Id. at 34-
35, 157. 
35. "De facto" marriage, as introduced by the 1926 Family Code, resembled in form the 
American common-law marriage, since it required, in addition to cohabitation, some evidence 
suggesting the existence of marital relations (though not necessarily consent). However, unlike 
common-law marriages, de facto marriages could be dissolved by de facto divorce, since registra-
tion had only evidentiary importance (§§ 19, 20). Id. at 157. 
36. Even before the introduction of de facto marriage in 1926, the 1918 Code established 
equal rights for children born inside and outside of marriage (§ 133). Id. at 37. 
37. The 1918 Family Code thus provided that "parental obligations •.. are suspended in the 
event of the children being maintained by public or government care." Note to§ 161 in id. at 40. 
38. Alexandra Kollontai, Commissar of Social Welfare, said in 1921: "The family - de-
prived of all economic tasks, not holding responsibility for a new generation, no longer providing 
women with the basic source of their existence - ceases to be a family. It narrows and is trans-
formed into a union of the marital pair based on mutual contract." See W. Goldman, supra note 
32, at 47-48. 
39. In Lenin's words: "[O]ne cannot be a democrat and a socialist without demanding full 
freedom of divorce ..•• " W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 42-43. 
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ily: in public child-rearing and in a society in which "[s]ewing, clean-
ing and washing, like mining, metallurgy and machine production, 
would become branches of the people's economy."40 And what the 
Soviet economy in the 1920s could not even vaguely afford, capitalist 
economies have since achieved: McDonald's and its competitors, like 
the "great public cauldron"41 envisaged by early Soviet reformers, 
have largely replaced the "nervewracking and stultifying drudgery"42 
of private household production, and "[f]ree education for all children 
in public schools" - once a demand of the Communist Manifesto43 -
has become commonplace. 
More thoroughly than we, early Soviet family law rejected legal 
formalism: unconstrained by concerns for individual rights and opti-
mistic about soon-to-be-achieved economic abundance, Soviet reform-
ers saw even fewer reasons to be conceptually precise about the 
determination of family law obligations than we do today.44 For ex-
ample, while modem Western family law, in even its most radical ver-
sion, still preserves distinctions between legal marriage and 
cohabitation, 45 early Soviet law, with its recognition of "factual" mar-
riage, simply equated the two. Still, both approaches reveal the same 
disbelief in the constitutive powers of law and the same reliance on 
virtually unguided discretionary judicial decisionmaking. 46 And both 
modem W estem and early Soviet family law reflect the same atomistic 
view of the family, which looks not to the unit but to its individual 
members - so much so, that the Soviet 1918 Family Code even out-
lawed adoption, since it would make no sense to create artificial family 
ties that in any event would soon be replaced by state care.47 But then, 
the Soviets, like other revolutionaries before and after them, 48 had 
strong ideological reasons for rejecting mediating groups standing be-
40. W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 40 (describing Kollontai's views). 
41. Id. at 41 (quoting Soviet economist Evgeny Preobrazhenskii). 
42. Id. at 41 (quoting Lenin). 
43. Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER, 
supra note 26, at 490. 
44. The relaxed Soviet attitude toward legal precision was reflected, for example, in the 1926 
Code's rules on the determination of paternity. Ifin a paternity case several men were found to 
have had intercourse with the mother, Soviet law did not - like other civil law systems at the 
time - apply the exceptio plurium rule which excluded the liability of all suspects. Instead, § 32 
of the Code gave the court free rein to pick any father it wanted from among the different candi-
dates. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at 160. 
45. Even Swedish law, which has largely merged the legal treatment of the consequences 
arising out of marriage and cohabitation, continues to assign to marriage the "central position" 
in family law. P. 274. 
46. During the debate preceding the enactment of the 1926 Family Code, Nikolai Krylenko 
(later Commisar of Justice) thus compared - approvingly - the power of Soviet judges to 
determine whether or not cohabitation arrangements qualified as de facto marriages with the 
lawmaking powers of American judges. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at 93. 
47. See W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 64. 
48. For a comparison of the family law legislation of the French Revolution, Maoist China, 
and Soviet Russia, see Miiller-Freienfels, Zur revolutioniiren Familiengesetzgebung, insbesondere 
1746 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1734 
tween citizen and state, and between the old and the "new" man, and 
thus set out actively to attack institutions (like the family or the 
church) that under capitalism were allowed to wither more 
gradually. 49 
However, it is with respect to their common moral ambivalence 
that early Soviet and modem W estem marriage philosophies most re-
semble each other. Both believed or believe man to be the product of 
social circumstances: the Soviets because of their faith in economic 
determinism, their modem counterparts because of their faith in the 
behavioral sciences. Both early Soviet and our modem family law ap-
proach marriage breakdown not as a matter of personal guilt but as a 
social disfunctioning, requiring a quasi-medical rather than a moral 
response. Both put few or no brakes on unilateral divorce and concen-
trate instead on the ex-spouses' factual needs. As a result, both ideolo-
gies downplay the spouses' individual responsibilities for each other. 
Both preach a minimal morality: freedom "[f]rom the ties of law, jus-
tice and civil authority,"50 and the overwhelming importance of per-
sonal gratification.51 When, during the debate of the draft of the 1926 
Soviet Family Code in the R.S.F.S.R. Central Executive Committee, a 
peasant delegate objected to unlimited freedom of divorce with the al-
most desperate insistence that "[o]ne must have an important reason," 
the house responded with laughter. "What reason?" Comrade 
Krylenko shouted from his seat. 52 He spoke for us. 
Finally, like our modem family law, early Soviet law aimed to re-
place private law with public law regulation and strove for a democrati-
zation of family law. "[A]ll law is public," Lenin advised the drafters 
of the first Soviet Civil Code;53 therefore, all socialist law (like much of 
our own family law) should address legal disputes as matters of social 
policy rather than of individual rights. And as proletarian law, Soviet 
zum Ehegesetz der Vo/ksrepublik China vom 1.5.1950, in 2 Ius PRtVATUM GENTIUM: FEST· 
SCHRIFT FOR MAx RHEINSTEIN ZUM 70. 843 (1969). 
49. See p. 298 (discussing the loss of intermediaries between state and individual). 
50. This was one of the aspects of socialist love that Lenin acknowledges in a letter to Inesse 
Armand. Letter from Vladimir Lenin to lnesse Armand, Jan. 17, 1915, reprinted in R. SCHLES· 
INGER, supra note 32, at 26-27. 
51. Compare M. GLENDON, supra note 12, at 144 with Schneider, supra note 15, at 1847. 
One could argue that the early socialists had a less self-centered view of marital happiness than 
we do today; after all, Lenin, in his letter to Inesse Armand, supra note 50, at 26, also reproaches 
her for promoting "free love" and for downplaying such important socialist values as "serious-
ness in love" or childbirth. But Lenin was more prudish than most of his comrades; his views 
conflicted with August Bebel's libertarianism, A. BEBEL, supra note 30, at 475 ("The satisfaction 
of sexual drives is as much the personal business of each individual as the satisfaction of any 
other natural drive.") and with Alexandra Kollontai's refusal to see sexuality as a moral issue at 
all, see W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 45 ("[i]n nature there is neither morality nor immoral-
ity"). Even Lenin, however, like the drafters of the 1918 and 1926 Soviet Family Codes, would 
not have seen it as the law's task to enforce notions of morality. 
52. Excerpts of the debate are translated in R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at 26. 
53. See J. I!AzARD, CoMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 77 (1975). 
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family law, like ours today, rejected hierarchies within the family and 
showed less interest in the family problems of the rich than in those of 
the poor.54 
So where does this comparison leave us? It suggests that early so-
cialist and modern capitalist family law share many of the same juris-
prudential assumptions about what law should do. Both focus on the 
satisfaction of human needs rather than on the vindication of legal 
entitlements. Both aim for socially correct solutions rather than for 
individual fairness: redefine conflicts, which once were thought to 
have moral dimensions, as personal crises, 55 try to realize the "best 
interest" of all persons involved, search for therapeutic, flexible, prag-
matic responses, and are ready to enlist the help of social science ex-
perts in this search. 56 
Both early Soviet and modern Western family law reformers look 
more to the future than to the past: they are less concerned with re-
dressing bygone injuries or with honoring promises between spouses 
than with rearranging people's lives in ways that will best enable them 
to deal with the problems ahead of them. Both therefore favor flexible 
solutions, are willing to alter decisions if circumstances have 
changed, 57 and - since easy modification reduces the costs of initial 
mistakes - are not particularly finicky about standards of proof. 58 
Both early socialist and latter-day capitalist family law reformers seem 
to reject the cold, technical precision of traditional legal doctrine in 
favor of "warmer" law, using loose legal language, relying heavily on 
"human experience,"59 and searching for substantive rather than pro-
54. Hence, for instance, the early and short-lived Soviet abolition of rights of inheritance. 
See Griffin, The About Turn: Soviet Law of Inheritance, 10 AM. J. CoMP. L. 431 (1961). 
55. See Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Prof essiona/ Language, and Legal Change in Child 
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 733, 744-60 (1988). 
56. For a discussion of the significant impact of one social science theory - the "psychologi-
cal parent" thesis of Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit- on our case law, see Davis, "There is a book 
out . .• ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1539 (1987) 
(commenting on J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (1973)). 
57. For a socialist example, consider the practice of "cassation" or "review in the supervisory 
instance," which allows the Procuracy or certain high courts to appeal a judicial decision even 
after it has become final between the parties. See J. HAzARD, supra note 53, at 115-16. For a 
family law example, consider the pervasive practice of judicial custody modification. 
58. Most family law controversies - such as custody, alimony, child support, visitation, etc. 
- can fairly easily be relitigated and are decided on the basis of "a preponderance of the evi-
dence." See e.g., TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 11.15(a) (Vernon 1986). Only the termination of 
parental rights, being "final and irrevocable," requires at least "clear and convincing evidence" of 
parental unfitness. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-49, 759 (1982); see also TEX. 
FAM. CoDE ANN. § 11.15(b) (Vernon 1986). 
59. Melton has drawn attention to the Supreme Court's proclivity to appeal to "human expe-
rience" especially when dealing with children, citing references to the "pages of human experi-
ence," Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979), the "ordinary course of human experience," 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972), and the "reality of human experience," Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 617 (1982). See Melton, The Clashing of Sym-
bols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 345, 347 (1987). 
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cedural justice. If Marxism and its "parental law"60 seem to "have 
taken the family as their model of human order,"61 our family law, 
from the looks of it, might have copied many of its solutions from the 
Marxist classics. 
The transformation of family law that Glendon has chronicled, 
and its "socialist" overtones that I have just described, seem to be part 
of a general movement toward a more activist state, of which socialism 
was just the beginning and of which our family law will not be the end. 
Many people have pointed to similar developments outside of family 
law. Abram Chayes has drawn attention to the recent phenomenon of 
"public law litigation" involving the realization of forward-looking 
policy goals rather than the vindication of already established individ-
ual rights. 62 Judith Resnik has analyzed the rule of "managerial" 
judges who no longer simply adjudicate the cases brought before them 
but plan and negotiate a case's progress until its resolution and be-
yond. 63 Patrick Atiyah has noted the change in judicial focus "from 
principle to pragmatism" and from a preoccupation with generally ap-
plicable rules to attempts to do justice to the facts of each individual 
case. 64 Lawrence Friedman and Robert Percival6S and David Clark66 
have written about changes in the functions of courts from settling 
disputes to routin~ administration. Everywhere, it seems, our law is 
turning more "socialist." 
This is not the place to discuss such overall changes. But I do 
want to talk about their implications for our family law and for the 
people whose lives it affects. What started out as a liberation move-
ment - both for the early socialists and for modern advocates of fam-
ily law reform - ended up as a legal system increasing dependence. 
The new family law's focus on needs rather than rights and its search 
for solutions which are socially correct rather than fair to the individ-
ual parties have led to a shift in authority: from the individual right-
holder (the "aggrieved" spouse, the custodial parent, etc.), who in the 
past more or less knew what to expect from the law, to the court, 
which in its unbridled wisdom can fashion that solution to a family's 
problems that app:eals most to the judge's paternal instincts and val-
60. The analysis of Soviet law as "parental law" was developed by Harold Berman. See H. 
BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 6 (1963), 
61. C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLU· 
TJON TO THE PRESENT 472 (1980). 
62. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976). 
63. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
64. Atiyah, From Principle to Pragmatism: Changes in the Functions of the Judicial Process 
and the Law, 65 IOWA L; REV. 1249 (1980). 
65. Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San Benito 
Counties, 10 LAW & SocY. REV. 267 (1976). 
66. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in 
the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981). 
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ues. And while most family disputes will in fact not be decided by 
courts - about ninety percent of domestic cases are settled67 - the 
absence of clear-cut rules and the resulting uncertainty of outcomes 
will nevertheless put the disputants at the mercy of legal experts who 
know the ropes, who control the process Gudges and mediators68), or 
who claim special insight into its workings (the lawyers69), and so can 
pressure the parties into accepting solutions that suit the professionals' 
goals but that often seem unresponsive to the spouses' personal senses 
of justice and to their self-defined needs. 70 Judges thus lean on spouses 
to settle; 71 attorneys "sell" solutions to clients who do not understand 
the legal implications involved; 72 and divorce mediators may engage in 
"twisting arms"73 to get reluctant spouses to compromise. 
There has always been a connection between the search for 
"warmer" law and procedural informality; 74 between procedural in-
formality and the belief in the law's capacity to achieve substantive 
67. Only about 10% of all custody cases and about 10 to 15% of all divorce cases are con-
tested in court. For custody cases, see L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UN-
EXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcONOMIC CoNSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN .AMERICA 
217 (1985). For divorce cases, see Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Medi-
ation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 525, 530 (1984). 
68. On the practice of English divorce mediators to subtly guide the disputants toward out-
comes that the mediators themselves prefer, see Greatbatch & Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: 
Some Preliminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LA w & SocY. REv. 
613 (1989). 
69. Sarat and Felstiner have shown how divorce lawyers tend to emphasize their usefulness 
to clients by characterizing the divorce process as so irrational and confusing that only an in-
sider's know-how and connections can ensure satisfactory outcomes. See Sarat & Felstiner, Law-
yers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 
(1989) [hereinafter, Sarat & Felstiner, Law Talk]; Sarat & Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the 
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAW & SocY. REv. 93 (1986). 
70. On the fundamentally different ways in which lawyers and their clients perceive their 
goals in the divorce process, see Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do in Divorce Cases?, 
20 LAW & SOCY. REV. 135 (1986). 
71. See Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, The Process of Negotiation: An Explanatory Investiga-
tion in the Context of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 1133, 1154 (1988). 
72. Priest & Whybrow, Child Custody in the Divorce Court and the Domestic Court, 17 FAM. 
L. 57 (1988). The authors report on the practice among English solicitors of persuading their 
clients (especially women) to accept joint custody as a means of defusing arguments over physical 
custody and thus as a useful strategy to avoid contested hearings. Solicitors will advocate joint 
custody even though they do not believe "that there is any lay appreciation of a possible distinc-
tion between custody and care and control" and even though they are convinced that their clients 
"have only a very limited conception of parental rights" and "find it difficult or impossible to 
grasp the full implications of a joint [custody] order." Id. at 60. 
73. Bruch, And How Are the Children? The Effect of Ideology and Mediation on Child Cus-
tody Law and Children's Well-Being in the United States, 2 INTL. J.L. & FAM. 106, 119 (1988). 
74. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), for example, the Supreme Court 
rejected the need for jury trials in juvenile courts since they would not significantly improve the 
accuracy of the courts' factfinding and would interfere with the juvenile justice system's unique 
pedagogical tasks, stating: "[T]he formality ... and the clamour of the adversary system" is at 
odds with the "concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention that the juvenile court system 
contemplates." 403 U.S. at 550 (Blackmun, J.). In a similar vein, see Chief Justice Burger's 
dissent in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), where he argues that the "benevolent" goals of the 
juvenile justice system and its ambition to provide "compassionate treatment" rather than pun-
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justice; between substantive justice and the need for technical experts 
who know how to define it; and between reliance on technical experts 
and contempt for the subjects of their expertise. Soviet family theo-
rists felt contempt for the Russian peasants whose "petty-bourgeois 
tendencies"75 led them to oppose a divorce reform that threatened the 
family-centered working and living style of the villages. Early propo-
nents of no-fault divorce felt contempt for family members when they 
suggested that divorce law should focus on "family rehabilitation, not 
the assertion of individual rights."76 Modem family law displays 
thinly disguised contempt for its addressees if its "[n]eeds-based dis-
pute resolution takes for granted the desire of expert helpers to meet 
needs .... "77 And since the neediest clients of our family law will be 
women and children, 78 the law, rather than being "a shield for auton-
omy and an instrument for realizing authentic projects,"79 will help to 
reinforce preexisting economic and social inequalities. Consider only 
this run-of-the-mill family law issue: the modification of custody 
rights - based upon some more or less vague "best-interest" standard 
- in situations in which the custodial parent intends to move out-of-
state and thus would make it more difficult for the noncustodial parent 
to see his or her child on a regular basis. Conventional doctrine re-
quires either the noncustodial spouse's or the court's consent to such 
relocation plans. . But since ninety percent of single-parent children 
live with their mothers and since seventy-five percent of custodial 
mothers want to move within four years after separation (often to live 
with new husbands),80 almost all relocation restrictions in custody 
cases affect women and thus make them triply dependent: on an ex-
husband for permission to move, on a new husband whom a woman is 
likely to follow to his place of employment, and on a judge who must 
be asked to supply a permission the former husband refused. In this 
scenario, a woman's factual and legal dependencies feed on each other. 
Far from emancipating family members, our law continues to hold 
them hostage. 
But can the law ever emancipate family members who in real life 
ishment require "not more but less of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial formal-
ism ..•. " 397 U.S. at 376 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
75. W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 285. 
76. Bradway, The Myth of the Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. R.Bv. 377, 394 (1937). 
77. Silbey & Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Cri-
tique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DEN. U. L. RBv. 437, 495 (1989). 
78. There is a large literature documenting the disproportionate economic impact of divorce 
upon women and children. See especially L. WEITZMAN, supra note 67; J. EEKELAAR & M. 
MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE (1986). 
79. See Trubek, The Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of 
Civil Procedure, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1988, at 111, 125 (describing the traditional 
liberal view of the purpose of Jaw). 
80. See Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce Children: Relocation, the Constitution and 
the Courts, 1985 .ARiz. ST. L.J. l, 2-3. 
May 1990] Family Traits 1751 
are weak and dependent? Why, for instance, did early Soviet family 
law reform not produce its hoped-for liberation? Because of the re-
formers' total disregard for economic and social realities. Believing 
that the law could "lead the wide working masses forward"81 (and as 
Marxists they should have known better82), socialist legislators en-
acted a radical marriage philosophy that was backed neither by the 
enormous public funds its realization would have required, nor by the 
customs and morals of the vast majority of a largely agrarian popula-
tion. And while it would be too easy to blame the law for the wide-
spread family disintegration and for the thousands of homeless 
children roaming the streets throughout the period of the reforms83 
(post-war disorders, revolution, and famine84 would have undermined 
the most timid family policy), the spectacular failure of Marxist family 
ideology legitimated the brutally conservative retrenchment of the law 
under Stalin. 85 The early reformers had been "caught within the 
tragic contradiction of trying to build socialism in an underdeveloped 
country."86 
Why has our own family law reform, if anything, increased the 
dependence of the family's weakest members? Maybe because we have 
not been willing to acknowledge and live up to our implicitly "social-
ist" family vision. Modem family law, like its early Soviet counter-
part, presumes the unlimited freedom to cast off marital bonds, 
downplays family members' responsibility for each other, and legiti-
mates substantial state involvement in child-rearing and education. 
Yet, despite these "socialist" attitudes and despite the fact that mod-
em capitalist countries would be much better able to afford "socialist" 
family policies than Soviet society was in the 1920s, we are reluctant to 
accept and to underwrite the social and economic costs of our chang-
ing family ideology. To put it pointedly: as far as our family policy is 
concerned, we might well be caught within the tragic contradiction of 
not building socialism in a developed country. Especially in the 
United States, our "socialist" family-law imagery clashes badly with 
our capitalist public-spending habits. As Glendon's evidence shows, 
81. R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at 110 (quoting Krylenko, Senior Deputy Public Prose-
cutor, during the debate of the Draft of the 1926 Family Code by the RSFSR Central Executive 
Committee, Oct. 17, 1925). 
82. Consider Marx's classic shorthand formula in his "Critique of the Gotha Program," in 
K. MARX & F. ENGELS, AUSGEWAHLTE SCHRIFrEN IN ZWEI BANDEN, VOL. II 7, 17 (1961) 
("The law can never surpass the economic organization and resulting cultural development of 
society.") (my translation). 
83. On the besprizorniki (shelterless ones), the estimated seven-and-a-half million children 
"starving and dying" in Russia by 1922, see W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 78. 
84. On the 1921 famine in Russia, see id. at 89. 
85. See id. at 338. In 1936, abortion was outlawed in the USSR; in 1944, factual marriage 
and the right of unmarried mothers to bring paternity suits and support claims against extramar-
ital fathers were abolished. See R. SCHLESINGER, supra note 32, at 373. 
86. W. Goldman, supra note 32, at 329. 
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Western European family law systems have been more successful in 
integrating family ideology and policy: either by reemphasizing pri-
vate responsibilities87 or by strengthening the state's financial support 
for the family. 88 But European countries, too, with the possible excep-
tion of Sweden, have been reluctant to pick up the tab for family legis-
lation and case law that would work best in a socialist utopia. 
What is to be done? We caiinot expect our family law to undo 
dependencies that are grounded in social conditions outside of the law 
- in poverty, unequal earning capacities, childcare or housing 
problems, drug abuse, and the like. The real solutions will have to 
focus on what Glendon calls "family ecology" (p. 306): the fashioning 
of general policies dealing with urban renewal, welfare, tax matters, 
and other issues in ways that are mindful of the need to encourage 
"nurturing environments" (p. 308) in which family members will find 
it easier to care for each other and to gain control over their own lives. 
As Glendon and <;>thers have suggested, such policies should focus on 
children rather than adults, in order to bypass legal distinctions arising 
from different family structures and to meet the needs of the family's 
weakest members. 89 
But what can ~he law do? Our present family law has intentionally 
personalized the resolution of family disputes by providing only the 
vaguest of legal guidelines and by placing decisions almost entirely in 
the hands of those people who manage the disputing process: judges, 
who fill the void of discretionary provisions with their own values (and 
prejudices?), and lawyers, who devise their clients' negotiating strate-
gies based on what they think the judges will do.90 By allowing so 
much human input, the law hoped to foster solutions that would be 
sensitive to each family member's individual needs. But despite its 
ambitions to be parental and therapeutic, our family law, unlike a real-
life parent, has cared for the strong better than for the weak. It has 
made it easy for spouses to walk out on each other, has deprived the 
spouse left behind of bargaining advantages that had been available 
under previous legal regimes, has disavowed all but the most minimal 
post-divorce responsibilities between former spouses, has eliminated or 
reduced alimony and child-support obligations,91 and has undermined 
87. Sweden, despite its welfare-state policies, considers child support to be the primary obli-
gation of parents. P. 22~. 
88. Elsewhere, Glendon notes the "relatively generous package of public benefits and services 
for one-parent families that exists in Sweden and, to a lesser degree, in France and West Ger· 
many." P. 237. 
89. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 
60 TuL. L. REv. 1165, 1'173 (1986) (proposing a "children first" principle in divorce law); see 
also, e.g., V. FUCHS, supra note 3, at 130. 
90. On lawyers' claims to special insight into the likely behavior of judges, see Sarat & Fel· 
stiner, Law Talk. supra note 69, at 1676. 
91. On the decrease ip real monetary value of child-support awards under no-fault divorce 
law, see Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns/or 
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the position of custodial parents vis-a-vis their noncustodial ex-
spouses.92 With the best of intentions, the law has weakened people's 
control over their lives at a time when their autonomy is most 
threatened by emotional disarray and by economic uncertainties. 
Socialists would not have been surprised at this outcome. They 
have learned, over the decades, to distrust legal systems which claim 
that legal formalism stands in the way of caring and benevolent poli-
cies and today are trying to restore to their law its "age-old"93 func-
tion of protecting individual self-determination. Nonsocialist legal 
professionals, too, have become suspicious of the state's capacity to 
sustain a truly parental relationship with its citizens. In re Gault 94 
marks the disappointment of our hopes to turn the law into a vehicle 
of "care and solicitude"95 in the context of juvenile delinquency. 
More recently, our doubts about the law's ability to promote human 
warmth and interconnectedness have led to a reevaluation of alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR). Like our family law (and like socialist 
law), ADR rejects traditional win-or-lose outcomes in favor of com-
promises, tries to develop "a consensus about future conduct rather 
than [assign] responsibility for events in the past,"96 views personal 
conflicts as embedded in social contexts, and looks to the satisfaction 
of needs rather than the vindication of rights. 97 But we now begin to 
suspect that without the safeguards of procedural formalism the weak 
are likely to be outmaneuvered by the strong, that lawyers and 
mediators follow their own rather than their clients' agendas,98 and 
that substantive justice, at least for those least able to look out for 
themselves, is as elusive as ever. 99 The state, whatever the parens pa-
Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 473 (1979). From 
1983 to 1985, after adjusting for inflation, both child-support awards and actual support pay-
ments fell by about 12% despite the fact that the real average income of male workers rose from 
$19,630 to $20,650. See Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families With Dependent Chil-
dren: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 457, 
511 (1987-88). 
92. On the negative impact of joint custody statutes and of custody mediation, see Bruch, 
supra note 73. 
93. See What Should a Law Governed State Be? (roundtable discussion), SOVIET L. & 
GOVT., Summer 1989, at 51, 53. 
94. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding juvenile has right to notice of charges as well as to counsel, 
confrontation, and cross-examination of witness, and has privilege against self-incrimination in 
juvenile commitment proceedings). 
95. 387 U.S. at 15. 
96. Silbey & Sarat, supra note 77, at 453. 
97. Id. at 485. 
98. See Greatbatch & Dingwall, supra note 68, at 638-39. 
99. Empirical studies of custody mediation suggest that mediation is more attractive to 
higher than lower status litigants and that men decide to mediate because they anticipate losing 
in court. See Pearson, Thoennes & Vanderkooi, The Decision to Mediate: Profiles of Individuals 
Who Accept and Reject the Opportunity to Mediate Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, 
6 J. DIVORCE 17 (1982). Studies also show that fathers tend to be more satisfied with mediation 
results than mothers and that mediation leads to more joint custody arrangements than litiga-
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triae doctrine may tell us, is not our parent; it does not love us, does 
not put us to bed at night or get us up in the morning, does not laugh 
at our jokes or console us in our grief. 100 
I therefore propose that we listen to our self-doubts, learn from our 
socialist cousins, and redirect our attention in family law to legal for-
malism and to tpe protection of individual rights. Rights have re-
cently come under attack not only in family law. Critical legal 
theorists have accused rights of being too indeterminate to ensure our 
protection, of reinforcing our separation from others, of masking the 
persistence of hierarchies, and of fooling us into accepting the law's 
questionable claims to legitimacy. 101· But I doubt that rights are all 
that "alienating" or "mystifying." As E. P. Thompson said: "[Peo-
ple] will not be mystified by the first man who puts on a wig." 102 On 
the contrary, they usually know what they want, go rationally about 
achieving it, 103 and like best those judicial procedures that give them 
control over the disputing process and that respect their autonomy. 104 
The fashionable anti-rights talk in our law reviews, with its smell 
of privilege, thus has not appeared very convincing to people of color 
or to the poor, to whom a court is one of the very few "outsider[s] 
with clout"105 who may listen to their side of an argument. Barbara 
tion. See Emery & Weyer, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: An Experimental Evaluation 
of the Experience of Parents, 55 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 179 (1987). Because joint 
custody, as presently practiced, tends to assign to mothers a comparable amount of physical 
custody as under sole custody standards, cf. id. at 185, but allows fathers more input into deci· 
sions affecting the child, joint custody in fact reduces the mother's rights though not her work 
load. 
100. The Irish Supreme Court, in a recent decision, thus has declared invalid all care orders 
in which state health boards were awarded custody over neglected children. Corporate bodies, 
the court held, could not be described as "fit person[s]" to care for children under the 1908 
Children's Act; only real men and women, foster parents or social workers individually named 
by the court, could do so. Reported in Bull of Legal Developments, No. 22, Nov. 17, 1989, at 
251. 
101. For a typical survey of the Critical Legal Studies movement's objections to the concept 
of rights, see Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
102. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK Acr 262 (1st 
American ed. 1975). 
103. See Galanter, Vision and Revision: A Comment on Yngvesson, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 647, 
650 (Complainants "shop[] rationally for effective remedies. The powerful avoid the courts be· 
cause they can take care of themselves, and the powerless use courts to make up for their weak· 
ness."). For minority objections to the denigration of rights, see Williams, A/chemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); Mat· 
suda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.·C.L. L. 
REv. 323 (1987). 
104. A recent empirical study comparing tort litigants' attitudes toward trial, court-annexed 
arbitration, and judicial settlement conferences found that while litigants were not particularly 
interested in the absence or presence of formalism itself, they did want hearings to be careful, 
unbiased, and dignified and wanted to exercise some control over the handling and the ultimate 
outcome of their cases. For these reasons, litigants preferred trial and arbitration over settlement 
conferences. See E. LIND, R. MAcCoUN, P. EBENER, w. FELSTINER, D. HENSLER, J. RESNICK 
& T. TYLER, THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LmGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT·AN· 
NEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CoNFERENCES (1989). 
105. Galanter, supra note 103, at 649. 
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Y ngvesson, for instance, has reported how poor urban women use 
courts in domestic disputes to shore up their cases against neighbors 
or abusive husbands or lovers and how courts have slowly begun to 
assume a more activist role in processing such complaints. 106 We 
should take our cue from such strategies and ask how courts could be 
turned into more reliable allies of dependent family members in other 
disputing contexts such as in divorce or custody conflicts, which under 
present law are too unresponsive to legal argumentation to hold out 
much promise for the restoration of the parties' autonomy. 
But in looking to rights as a means to empower the powerless, we 
must also remember that rights will not automatically be useful to un-
derdogs. Like knives, rights cut at least as well in the hands of the 
strong as in the hands of the weak. If the law is to protect those who 
need it most, we must not repeat the mistakes of the early socialists, 
must not assume that the law's clients are self-reliant and strong, but 
instead must acknowledge the reality of their dependence and devise 
rights that do not require special resources, savvy, or stamina to be 
wielded effectively. 
That suggests a family law that is dominated by fixed rules and is 
hostile to bargaining. Some people might disagree. Martha Minow, 
for instance, has tried to salvage rights-discourse by praising its open-
ness and its capacity to further conversations between the protagonists 
who, in appealing to rights, affirm a common vocabulary and a shared 
understanding of values.107 In this view, talking and listening to an 
opponent, giving reasons and responding to the reasons of others, and, 
I suppose, even down-to-earth bargaining, would lend warmth and in-
terconnectedness to the use of a concept as fraught with potential for 
reinforcing hostility and alienation as the concept of rights. If rights-
discourse in this fashion should keep doors open for "continuing con-
versations," 108 fixed rules and nonnegotiable rights, with their cut-
and-dried answers, could only serve to shut people up. 
But even if I believed that rights-talk needed "salvaging"l09 (and I 
do not), it seems to me that a process-oriented justification of rights 
does not fit the realities of family-law litigation. In a world in which 
ninety percent of all disputes are settled, courts do not "orchestrate" 
discourses 110 between the litigants. Most discourses will take place be-
tween the parties' attorneys, who in turn, in explaining the legal pro-
106. Yngvesson, Re-examining Continuing Relations and the Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 623, 
641. 
107. Minow, Are Rights Right for Children?, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 203, 211 (1987) 
[hereinafter Minow, Rights/or Children]; see also Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Rob-
ert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860 (1987). 
108. Minow, Rights for Children, supra note 107, at 211. 
109. The term is taken from Milner, The Denigratlon of Rights and the Persistence of Rights 
Talk: A Cultural Portrait, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 631, 637 (1989). 
110. Minow, Rights for Children, supra note 107, at 212. 
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cess to their clients, will represent it as irrational, arbitrary, dependent 
on personal pull, and as best left to the experts. 111 Most clients, more-
over, do not share their lawyers' perception of the dispute as one cen-
tering mainly on money but look for interpersonal justice and for 
emotional vindication.112 If we want to shore up the fragile autonomy 
of family members in a process that now is only remotely determined 
by legal rules, we must make the parties immune to the manipulation 
of judges, lawyers, or higher status opponents. 
One way to do that would be to reduce judicial discretion with 
more precisely drafted statutory language. Rather than awarding cus-
tody based on an amorphous best-interest standard, for instance, we 
should imitate those jurisdictions that follow the "primary caretaker" 
rule. 113 Rather than promoting a bland "joint custody" policy -
which now may cover a multitude of custodial arrangements, most of 
which differ from former sole custody only by giving the primary care-
taker (most likely the mother) fewer rights than before - we should 
limit joint custody to joint physical custody and thus to those rela-
tively few cases in which father and mother genuinely share child-rear-
ing duties. Promising examples of such greater statutory precision are 
the new child support guidelines (prodded by federal· legislation), 114 
now effective in forty-three states, 115 that use quantitative formulas to 
determine child-support obligations as a percentage of the supporting 
parent's disposable income.116 While in the not-so-distant days of ju-
dicial illusions of grandeur the "mechanical application of a percent-
age formula" was thought to violate demands of individualized 
justice,117 legislators have come to realize that discretionary support 
awards, set by mostly male judges against mostly male defendants, too 
often underestimate what it costs to raise children. 
But even precise legal standards will not necessarily protect parties 
in those ninety percent of all cases in which domestic disputes are set-
tled. Detailed statutory guidelines may cast more of a shadow over 
111. Sarat & Felstiner, Law Talk, supra note 69, at 1682; see also supra note 69. 
112. Griffiths suggests that "lawyers and clients are in effect largely occupied with two differ-
ent divorces: lawyers with a legal divorce, clients with a social and emotional divorce." Grif-
fiths, supra note 70, at 155. 
113. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W.Va. 1981). 
114. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, § 18(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1305 
(1982) (as amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103, 102 Stat. 
2343 (1988)). 
115. Freed & Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 568 
(1990). 
116. On the impact of child support guidelines, see Pearson, Thoennes & Tjaden, Legislating 
Adequacy: The Impact of Child Support Guidelines, 23 LAW & SocY. REv. 569 (1989). 
117. Cooper v. Cooper, 102 Ill. App. 3d 872, 876, 430 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1981); Rundle v. 
Rundle, 107 Ill. App. 3d 880, 884, 438 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1982). It is ironic that the trial court's 
attempt to limit judicial discretion "in the interest of judicial economy and consistency" was in 
itself considered "an abuse of discretion." Rundle, 107 III. App. 3d at 884, 438 N.E.2d at 232. 
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the attorneys' bargaining process than bland ''best-interest" or "just-
and-right" standards, since they announce in advance the costs of fail-
ing to reach an agreement. Still, the persuasive powers of even the 
most carefully drafted statutory directives are easily undermined. 
Most guidelines tend to include a catch-all escape clause, meant to 
assure justice in the unforeseeable circumstances of an individual case, 
but nonetheless compromising the quest for judicial precision. Most 
family judges, used to operating under conditions of unlimited discre-
tion, may not pay much attention to the carefully worded language of 
the law.118 The parties to a domestic dispute may not insist on their 
rights, for fear of losing custody, for instance, or to get out of a bur-
densome marriage as quickly as possible. They may underestimate 
their future financial needs.119 They may lack the advice of a law-
yer, 120 or their attorney, eager to get on with the case, may be too 
quick to compromise. Empirical research thus suggests that while a 
party's persistent opposition to the divorce increases the likelihood of 
an advantageous settlement, 121 spouses nevertheless often do not insist 
on their rights and that women especially (as the most likely recipients 
of support) often forgo claims to which they would be legally enti-
tled.122 This may explain why the first reports on the impact of child-
support guidelines show increases in award levels which fall far short 
of the anticipated and hoped-for results. 123 
If we want to strengthen the protective power of rights, we there-
fore should think about removing at least those rights from the bar-
gaining process which because of their financial character lend 
themselves easily to exact statutory determination. Child support, 
measured in percentages of the obligor's disposable income, should be 
made mandatory - California's mandatory minimum-support rule 
118. At least, this seems to be the lawyers' view of what judges do. See Sarat & Felstiner, 
Law Talk, supra note 69, at 1673 (quoting a Massachusetts lawyer in a case involving substantial 
marital property: "[l]n this state the statute requires judges to consider fifteen separate 
things. • . . It is a pretty comprehensive list, but I've never seen a judge make findings on all of 
those things. They just hear a few and then divide things up."). 
119. Pearson, Thoennes & Tjaden, supra note 116, at 587, report on studies suggesting that 
divorcing parents themselves may seriously underestimate the post-divorce costs of raising their 
children. Since most support awards are based on parental agreements which courts will ex-
amine in only the most cursory fashion, such unwarranted parental optimism at the time of 
divorce may undermine much of the new support guidelines' protective effect. 
120. Pearson, Thoennes & Tjaden, id., found that parental support agreements were most 
likely to fall short of the guidelines' suggested award levels if neither party was represented by an 
attorney. Id. at 587. 
121. Melli, Erlanger & Chambliss, supra note 71, at 1169. 
122. Caesar-Wolf, Eidmann & Willenbacher, Die gerichtliche Eheliisung nach dem neuen 
Scheidungsrecht: Normstruktur und Verfahrenspraxis, 5 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 
202, 236 (1983). 
123. While researchers originally projected that actual child support amounts would more 
than double after the adoption of the new guidelines, Pearson, Thoennes and Tjaden found a 
rather modest average increase of 15 percent above pre-guideline award levels. Increases were 
highest for low-income divorces. See Pearson, Thoennes & Tjaden, supra note 116, at 585. 
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seems to me a step in the right direction.124 Pension-splitting along 
the lines of the West German Versorgungsausgleich, an equalization-
of-benefits scheme, under which all pension claims accumulated by 
both spouses during their marriage are computed, compared and 
equally divided, 125 should also be mandatory. Since most families 
must make do with very few resources, even rules like these would do 
little to alleviate the financial worries that in most cases predate and 
are only aggravated by a divorce. But they would equalize the eco-
nomic burden of marital failure now borne primarily by custodial 
mothers and children, would allow spouses to face the disruption of 
marriage with certainty about at least some of its consequences, and 
would reduce people's dependence on the generosity of judges and on 
the professional ardor of lawyers. And don't say that "mandatory 
rights" like the ones here suggested are contradictions in terms which 
reflect contempt for the spouses' contractual autonomy. Rights that 
protect against manipulation and exploitation by others betray as little 
contempt for their bearer as flu shots betray contempt for a patient. If 
the law, at least occasionally, can inoculate people against their depen-
dence on others, if it can brace their position in a precarious world, it 
will better enable family members to take control of their lives than if 
it continues to let professionals with titles and degrees decide what is 
good for them. 
Have I strayed too far from my original topic? Professor Glendon 
wanted to outline the major themes running through W estem family 
law and ideology. In the process, she has painted a portrait of the 
family in which we recognize not only ourselves but also un-
remembered ideological forefathers. I think we can learn from the re-
semblance even if Glendon may never have intended it. Not that it 
matters. It is the mark of any good portrait that it makes us speculate 
about the character of its sitter, and the mark of any good book that it 
sends our thoughts out into unexpected adventures. 
124. See Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984, CAL. Civ. CoDB §§ 4720-4732 (Deer-
ing Supp. 1990). 
125. § 1587-1587p BGB (German Civil Code); see also p. 218. 
